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“This day have I perfected your religion for you and completed My favour unto you, and have chosen for you as 
religion AL- ISLAM” Surah al Ma’ida: verse 3 
Islam is both a religion and a complete way of life.  
 
Abstract: 
Takaful has become the alternative method of providing insurance services that is deemed acceptable for 
Muslims. This paper looks at the different views of Islamic scholars on conventional insurance and the legal and 
practical aspects of takaful insurance. It also looks at the different models used by takaful operators and analyses 
several issues which may still riddle takaful practice. It concludes by proffering suggestions and 
recommendations that may resolve issues that have been noticed.        
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1. Introduction  
During the time of the Prophet and even in the first century after his death, every activity, financial or otherwise 
was regulated by Islamic principles. However, during ensuing years, particularly from the era of industrialization, 
Muslims worked under the unfortunate mistaken belief that Islamic law has no facility for banking and insurance, 
or that the one provided by Islamic law would not be adequate for the modern –and complicated- economic 
system. Thus there was a shift away from classical Islamic financial and economic systems (Kuran, 2005). In 
recent times however, there has been a shift towards re-islamization of all activities. To this end, a system of 
insurance has been introduced by Muslim economists to provide insurance within Islamic confines. The question 
that needs to be asked is ‘is it wholly Islamically acceptable or are there are aspects of it which may require 
further modification?  
1.1 Insurance: A Brief Explanation  
The service of insurance, as it is provided in conventional economies, is a commercial enterprise which 
undertakes to take over the risk of possible loss of assets due to the happening of an event in exchange for 
periodic payments of a determined amount by the beneficial owner of such assets (Dorfman, 1982). The insurer 
pays to the owner, either an amount of money which had been previously determined between them or an 
amount that covers the actual loss suffered. Either way, the insurance company hopes to collect more in premium 
payments than it has to pay out as claims from policy holders otherwise it would be operating at a loss. Any 
insured person, who never had to make a claim, loses the money he paid out as premium and profits are shared 
by shareholders of the company (Hardy Ivamy, 1970). 
The insured may sometimes recover nothing or more or less than the actual value of the loss. He may even 
eventually make a claim but the amount he has paid as premium may be greater than his claim (Rejda, 
2011) .This feature, unfortunately, has a lot in common with gambling (maysir) or wagering and some persons 
actually buy insurance with the hope that they may gain more than they have risked in premium payments . 
Gambling is unlawful for Muslims as indicated Surah al Baqarah (2: 219) and Surah al Maida (4:90) of the 
Qur’an.  
The possible absence of certainty regarding time and amount of payment and the amount the insured will claim 
at the time of loss raise questions as to the existence of gharar (uncertainty) in an insurance contract (Iqbal, 2005; 
Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2007). There is also the possible existence of elements of riba (also prohibited in Islamic law) 
in the transaction as insurance is often an unequal exchange between the insured and the policy holder Finally In 
conventional insurance, a beneficiary to a life insurance is considered absolute and may deal with the benefits of 
the policy as he deems fit. This is in contravention of Islamic rules of inheritance as the beneficiary may, in such 
a case, take to the detriment of legal heirs of the deceased. 
These issues do make conventional insurance questionable for Muslims. Though Siddiqi (1985), and Al Zarqa 
(1962), both eminent Islamic scholars, have made distinction between insurance and gambling. But the fact that 
the insured may lose his premium payments if no claim is made and the fact that monies paid are invested into 
interest bearing or illegal transactions cannot be ignored.  
1.2 Views of Islamic Scholars 
Scholars of Islamic economics have not been unanimous in their rulings regarding the position of conventional 
insurance and are divided into three groups (Rashid, 1993): The first group views insurance as illegal (haram) 
because it contravenes, under Islamic due to the existence of riba, gharar and maysir and there is no express 
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permissibility for insurance in the Qur'an or traditions of the Prophet Muhammad SAW. Scholars are who fall 
into this category include Sheikh Muhammad Salih al Munajid, Rahman Wahab Al Zuhayli and Shaikh 
Muhammad Ibn Adam Al Kawthari (Sohail, J, 2007).  
The second group (though a minority) considers conventional insurance, as it stands, as a necessary part of 
economic life which can be distinguished from those elements which would normally vitiate a contract for 
Muslims. Scholars who are in this category include Ibn Abidin a Hannafi jurist. The late Sheikh Mustafa Al 
Zarqa (1962) and Nejatullah Siddiqi (1985) also hold this view.  
The third group takes a moderate course from the former views. That insurance can be and is legal but if done 
within the confines and dictates of Islamic economic guidelines and regulations. Scholars who hold this view 
include Mohd Ma’sum Billah and Mufti Muhammad Taqi Usmani (2005). As an extension of this view, Muslim 
scholars and economists came together to reintroduce the concept of Islamic insurance into modern day society 
with modifications so that it would develop and grow in today’s economic environment.  In Sudan in 1979, the 
first company which would provide Shari’ah compliant insurance services was established and the service was 
called Takaful. 
 
2. The Islamic Insurance Company 
Takaful is the Arabic word for ‘guaranteeing each other’ and comes from the root word kafala (Bekkin, 2007). 
Different definitions have been advanced for the term takaful. It has been variously defined as “The Islamic 
insurance concept which is grounded is Islamic muamalat (commercial transactions) observing the rules and 
regulations of Islamic law” (Usman, M.T., 2000) and as “A type of Islamic insurance, where members contribute 
money into a pooling system in order to guarantee each other against loss or damage. Takaful-branded insurance 
is based on Shari’ah, Islamic religious law, and explains how it is the responsibility of individuals to cooperate 
and protect each other” (Ahmed, M. & Ahmed, S. nd) 
Takaful insurance is modeled on the framework of mutual insurance. A group of persons with the desire to ‘help 
one another’ in times of distress, contribute money into a common fund which will be sufficient to pay claims of 
members as they arise. (Maysami & Williams, 2006; The takaful system is based on what is referred to as the 
principle of ‘Tabarru’ (donation/charity). While other insurance contracts are usually entered into with a view to 
making profit, takaful is basically a tool for risk management and distribution based on ta’awun (solidarity and 
mutual assistance). Individual risks are not transferred to a third party -par adventure an insurance company- as 
is the case with conventional insurance (Rejda, E. G., 2011) but is shared among the members who agree to 
defray the losses of each other.  At the end of each financial year, if the fund has not been exhausted by the 
payment of claims, any excess is distributed among the members to the ratio of their contributions (Muslehuddin, 
2006). 
2.1 Modus Operandi 
The common practice has therefore become that persons place money within a fund via tabarru and undertake to 
indemnify each other for specified losses. The fund is managed by a takaful operator which is an entity separate 
from the contributors to the fund. It is usually a company with shareholders (not inclusive of the contributors to 
the fund). Therefore, according to Aly (2007) the Islamic insurance company is a hybrid of a Shari’ah compliant 
mutual structure for participants and a Shari’ah compliant management company.  
In administering the takaful fund, three general models have been adopted by Islamic insurance companies, with 
some variants of these models. The models are basically the methods designed for the purpose of providing 
remuneration for the takaful operator. Each model is expected to provide funds to cover not only operating 
expenses of the operator, but also include profits that will be distributed to its shareholders if any (Fahmy & 
Sakar, nd).    
i. The Mudarabah Model creates a partnership where the contributors are considered to be the rabb al 
mal (owners of the money) and the takaful operator is the mudarib (manager of the money) (Rahman, 
1979; Pasha & Hussain, 2013; Nagaoka, 2010; Chua, 2000). The takaful operator is expected to provide 
entrepreneurial skills to manage the fund by investing reserves from the fund so that profit is realized 
which is shared with the operator on a predetermined ratio. Any loss suffered is absorbed by the takaful 
participants (Abdullah & Dawood, 2009). A modified mudaraba model allows the operator to receive 
remuneration that will cover operating and management expenses before calculating the deficit or 
surplus realized from underwriting and also shares profits made from investments (Siddiqi, 1985). 
ii. The Wakala Model is a management contract where the takaful participants employ the operator to 
manage the fund on their behalf as wakeel (agent) and this is done following set guidelines laid down 
by them. In this model, the operator imposes an upfront fee for managing the fund (Htay & Zaharin, 
2011; Mohd, 2009). The operator is not entitled to share in the income generated from the takaful fund. 
The participants, on the other hand assume the risks involved with underwriting.   
iii. The Wakala Mudarabah Model combines the principles of mudarabah – sharing of profits realized 
from investment of reserve funds- with those of wakala which involve the payment of agency fees for 
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the management of the takaful funds.  The principles of mudarabah are applied towards the investment 
of funds while wakala is applied for running the business of the takaful operator. This means that the 
operator not only gets its fees for services rendered, it also becomes entitled to share in any profits made 
from investments as incentive (Akhter, 2010; Kwangit et al, 2012).  It is however, not entitled to a share 
of any underwriting surplus. 
iv. In the Waqf Model the shareholders of the takaful operator are the contributors to a fund which they 
cede to be used to compensate persons who suffer loss.  A party becomes a policyholder, not by making 
a contribution to the fund, but by filling out a form and taking out a subscription to the fund. The 
shareholders determine to whom and how much money should be paid. They also determine 
investments and use of surplus.  The Wakala Waqf model implies that the takaful participants contribute 
money to the fund which is then considered as a contribution to be used for charity and could include 
the provision of compensation for loss of property by any member. The operator is entitled to payment 
of management fees and a portion of returns on investment as mudarib (Abdullah & Yaacob, 2012). 
2.2 Legal Structure. 
The common practice is to have, attached to a takaful company, a Shari’ah supervisory board which ensures that 
its practices do not deviate from the Shari’ah accepted standard. In countries which operate the Islamic legal 
system, laws have been enacted which deal with issues ranging from the establishment of, to registration and 
regulation of the takaful company. In others, it has been argued that since the operation of takaful company is 
similar to the mutual cooperative, they should be regulated by the same mechanism that handles mutual 
companies. Unfortunately, in most countries where there are takaful operators, there is no structure for the 
control of mutual and cooperatives.       
The guiding principles of takaful companies are not usually found in enacted laws but in rulings of scholars of 
Islamic law and finance. However, a few countries like Malaysia and Pakistan have absorbed or enacted these 
into binding laws to regulate the companies.  
 
3. Issues in Takaful 
In the provision of insurance for Muslims via takaful, there are certain issues that exist- both legal and regulatory. 
These issues span questions as to the legality of certain practices from the point of view of the Shari’ah, to 
conflict of laws and the adequacy of the framework for takaful operations.  
The first of these is the framework for takaful itself. The common practice is to refer to donations made by 
policyholders as ‘tabarru’ which means donation. The Shari’ah ruling on donation, similar to those concerning 
gifts and charity, is that once made, the maker loses any right to it and may not recall it or receive back any 
portion of it (Mohd, 2011; Bekkin, 2007). Therefore, if paid contributions are referred to as tabarru, the 
policyholder would legally be unable to make a claim and receive compensation in cases of loss.    
Secondly, indemnification is made from the fund to which donations are made annually. However, where the 
fund is insufficient to cover all claims made on it, the donors to the fund are sometimes asked to make further 
compulsory donations to cover the deficit. This implies that the initial voluntary donation is tied to a possible 
future compulsory indeterminate amount (Archer, Abdelkarim & Ninhaus, 2009). 
Third, the models used in takaful also raise some questions. The mudarabah model creates conflict because 
tabarru is not meant to be a profit making and sharing relationship (Imran, 2011). Therefore, tabarru fund 
cannot be mudarabah capital at the same time. The sharing of underwriting surplus between the takaful 
participants and the operator turns the mutual insurance into a commercial venture not an agreement for mutual 
cooperation and assistance. Imran (2011) and Jaffer, Ismail, Noor & Unwin, (2010) express misgivings about the 
practice of the takaful operator advancing a non-profit loan to the fund in the case of deficit. This technically 
converts the operator, as mudarib, to a guarantor which is not a feature of the mudarabah contract. 
Also worrisome about the mudarabah model is the fact that with mudarabah, it is not legal for a party to the 
agreement to stipulate a certain amount as his proceeds from the arrangement. Only ratios of possible profits 
may be fixed (AbdulGafoor, 2001). However, in the practice of the modified mudarabah model, the fee of the 
takaful operator is fixed beforehand and is paid even if no profits are realized. Again, the fact that the contributor 
has the right to payment of a fixed amount (particularly in family takaful) as compensation which amount is 
determined at the time of entering into the tabarru agreement also goes against this basic principle of mudarabah.  
The common practice among takaful operators is of mixing financing models so as to maximize profits of 
operators. Muhammad (2011) raises the important issue of whether the takaful scheme is really a mutual co 
operation or proprietorship. One has the feeling that Islamic ideals have been sacrificed to ensure the economic 
viability of the takaful company.  Also, in takaful, the question to which there is no unanimous answer is 
whether the amount on the policy should be regarded as a gift to the beneficiary, or that he holds it in trust for 
the heirs of the deceases which may or may not include him (Ismail, 2009).  
A number of takaful company purchase reinsurance from conventional reinsurers due to the lack of adequate 
retakaful providers (Arbouna, 2000) or the retakaful operator may not be subjected to the same rigor of scrutiny 
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concerning Islamic principles as is done for the takaful company(Mohammad, 2009). This means that though a 
person may presumably obtain Shari’ah compliant insurance, there is still some tinge of illegality inserted into it 
as his operator does not enjoy same.    
Finally, a crucial issue is created by the conflict of laws regulating takaful. In most cases, the company may be 
bound to follow regulations and implement practices which are not Shari’ah compliant. In addition, each takaful 
operator usually has a Shari’ah Advisory Board whose function is to ensure that the takaful company operates 
within and remains Shari’ah compliant. The problem here is that there is no central Shari’ah board which would 
ensure the uniformity of practices amongst the companies.  
The absence of uniformity of laws regulating takaful, is also a deterrent to ensuring that the same service is 
obtained worldwide. While certain jurisdictions may have achieved a significant degree towards ensuring the 
system conforms to every Islamic ideal, others are still far behind. 
 
4. Observations and Recommendations 
There may still be room for improvement It is suggested that the term tabarru in takaful should be replaced with 
Musahamah (contribution) (Billah, 1999). The participant will then have no restriction in Islamic law to make a 
claim against the risk on the subject matter of the policy. The beneficiary under a life insurance policy should be 
regarded as a trustee on behalf of the heirs Third, the takaful company should not purchase reinsurance from 
companies that are not Shari’ah compliant and efforts should be made to establish companies which would 
provide adequate retakaful. 
Furthermore, scholars of Islamic finance and other stakeholders should come together to establish two things: a 
uniform framework for the operation of all takaful companies and a general Shari’ah supervisory board to ensure 
uniformity of practices. Finally, the takaful company must be liberated from the control of laws governing 
conventional insurance companies.  
 
5. Conclusion        
The assessment of conventional insurance indicates that an Islamic alternative is the preferred choice for 
Muslims thus the introduction of mutual insurance referred to as takaful. However, this system though striving to 
encapsulate Islamic principles still faces challenges. One must, however, agree that monumental bridges have 
been crossed towards the islamization of financial services.  Thus, despite the presence of certain practices and 
principles which should be subjected to closer scrutiny, takaful insurance is still the better alternative for 
Muslims.   
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